000			02089cam a2200313 a 4500
001			32391175
003			OCoLC
005			20240315100431.0
008			950331s1996 enk 001 0 eng
010			_a95015748
020			_a0521475031
020			_a9780521475037
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _dUKM _dBAKER _dNLGGC _dBTCTA _dYDXCP _dOCLCG _dUAB _dHEBIS _dOCLCQ _dZWZ _dBDX _dOCLCF
050	0	0	_aBD450 _b.L65 1996
082			_aARCH YNDC 126 L913S
100	1		_aLowe, E. J. _q(E. Jonathan) _914313
245	1	0	_aSubjects of experience / _cE.J. Lowe.
260			_aCambridge [England] ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c1996.
300			_ax, 209 p. ; _c23 cm.
490	1		_aCambridge studies in philosophy
500			_aIncludes index.
505	0		_a1. Introduction -- 2. Substance and selfhood -- 3. Mental causation -- 4. Perception -- 5. Action -- 6. Language, thought and imagination -- 7. Self-knowledge.
520			_aIn this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E.J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamably committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge.
650		0	_aAgent (Philosophy) _913247
650		0	_aSelf (Philosophy) _93877
650		0	_aSubject (Philosophy) _912528
830		0	_aCambridge studies in philosophy. _912531
942			_2ddc _cARCH
999			_c93067 _d93067