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Predestination, God's foreknowledge, and future contingents. / Translated with an introd., notes, and appendices by Marilyn McCord Adams [and] Norman Kretzmann
Material type:
TextLanguage: English, Latin Series: Century philosophy sourcebooksPublication details: New York : Appleton - century- crofts c 1969Description: ix, 136 pages ; 21 cmISBN: - 0390675008
- Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus. English
- ARCH YNDC 153.4 O16P
Contents:
Are passive predestination and passive foreknowledge real relations in the person who is predestinate and foreknown? -- In respect of all future contingents does God have determinate, certain, infallible, immutable, necessary cognition of one part of a contradiction? -- How can the contingency of the will, both created and uncreated, be preserved in the case of its causing something external? That is, can the will, as naturally prior to the caused act, cause the opposite act at the same instant at which it causes that act, or can it at another, subsequent instant cause the opposite act or cease from that caused act? -- Is there a cause of predestination in the predestinate and a cause of reprobation in the reprobate? -- In view of the fact that the propositions 'Peter is predestinate' and 'Peter is reprobate' are opposites, why cannot the one succeed the other in truth?
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| Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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SAIACS Archives Room | Yandell Collection | ARCH YNDC 153.4 O16P (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not for loan | 065627 |
Translation of Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Die et de futuris contigentibus
Bibliography: pages 115-128
Are passive predestination and passive foreknowledge real relations in the person who is predestinate and foreknown? -- In respect of all future contingents does God have determinate, certain, infallible, immutable, necessary cognition of one part of a contradiction? -- How can the contingency of the will, both created and uncreated, be preserved in the case of its causing something external? That is, can the will, as naturally prior to the caused act, cause the opposite act at the same instant at which it causes that act, or can it at another, subsequent instant cause the opposite act or cease from that caused act? -- Is there a cause of predestination in the predestinate and a cause of reprobation in the reprobate? -- In view of the fact that the propositions 'Peter is predestinate' and 'Peter is reprobate' are opposites, why cannot the one succeed the other in truth?
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