"A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references (pages 237-241) and index

The Mystery -- Reformulation of the Mystery -- Addressing the Reformulated Question -- Why Care? -- Preview of the Teleological Realist Answer -- Substance Dualism and Simplicity -- Why People Believe Substance Dualism -- Against Substance Dualism -- Prospects for Dualism -- Preview of the Simplicity Objection against Option 3 -- Entailment and the Three Options -- Reduction and the Need for Bridge Laws -- The Options Revisited -- Hooker-Churchland Reduction -- Functionalism and Option 2 -- Basic Exposition of Functionalism -- More Detailed Exposition of Functionalism -- Biconditionals and Bridge Laws -- Missed Generalizations and Autonomy? -- Strong Naturalism and Common-Sense Psychology -- The Proto-Science View of CSP -- Normativity -- Sensitivity to Context -- Mental States and Natural Kinds -- Against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation -- The Case for (BE) -- The Case against the Standard View -- Agency and Deviant Causal Chains -- The Problem -- A Solution Suggested by Mele -- Bishop and Peacocke's Attempted Solution -- Supervenience without Reduction: Option 3 without the Supernatural -- Definition of 'Supervenience' -- Does Supervenience Matter? -- Supervenience Does Not Entail Reduction: Three Proofs -- Application to Mind-Body Supervenience -- Explanations for Supervenience -- Agency and Teleological Explanation -- The Form of Teleological Explanation -- The Rationality Principle -- Applying the Rationality Principle -- The Nature of Reasons -- Observations about the Account

"In Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon argues that common-sense psychology (CSP) explanations are not causal but teleological - that they cite the purpose or goal of the behavior in question rather than an antecedent state that caused the behavior. CSP explanations of behavior, Sehon claims, are answering a question different from that answered by physical science explanations, and accordingly, CSP explanations and physical science explanations are independent of one another. Common-sense facts about mind and agency can thus be independent of the physical facts about human beings, and, contrary to the views of most philosophers of mind in recent decades, common-sense psychology will not be subsumed by physical science."--Jacket