Includes bibliographical references.

[pt]. 1. Preliminary distinctions and remarks -- 1. Necessity circumscribed -- 2. Modality de dicto and modality de re -- [pt]. 2. Modality de re : objections -- 1. The problem -- 2. Essentialism and set theoretical reduction -- 3. Essentialism and the number of apostles -- 4. Essentialism and the mathematical cyclist -- [pt]. 3. Modality de re : explanations -- 1. The locus of necessity -- 2. The Kernel function -- 3. Some objections -- A. The Kernel function and Kripke semantics -- B. Identity and the Kernel function -- C. Circularity and the Kernel function -- [pt]. 4. Worlds, books, and essential properties -- 1. Worlds -- 2. Books -- 3. Existence and properties in a world -- 4. Actuality -- 5. This world and the actual world -- 6. Relative possibility -- 7. Truth and truth-in-[is proportional to] -- 8. Necessary truth and essential properties -- 9. Some putative principles -- 10. What properties are essential to Socrates? -- 11. World-indexed properties -- 12. Could Socrates have been an alligator? -- [pt]. 5. The necessity of natures -- 1. Essence preliminarily characterized -- 2. The nature of essence -- 3. Essences and proper names -- 4. Hesperus and Phosphorus --

[pt]. 6. Transworld identity or worldbound individuals? -- 1. The question -- 2. Socrates in [is proportional to] and Socrates in W -- 3. The problem of transworld identity -- A. The problem stated -- B. A temporal analogy -- C. The problem resolved -- D. Essence and transworld identity -- E. Does ramification destroy information? -- 4. Objections to TWI-- 5. Counterpart theory -- 6. Semantic inadequacies of counterpart theories -- A. Socrates and Xenophon -- B. Socrates and Socrates-identity -- 7. Metaphysical inadequacies of counterpart theory -- [pt]. 7. Possible but unactual objects : the classical argument -- 1. The question -- 2. Modal logic and possible objects -- 3. How shall we take the semantics? -- 4. Pure and applied semantics -- 5. Applied semantics and possible objects -- 6. Are there nonexistent objects? -- 7. The classical argument -- 8. Proper names and negative existentials : Russell -- 9. Proper names and negative existentials : Searle -- 10. Proper names and negative existentials : the historical chain view -- 11. Some varieties of singular existentials --

[pt]. 8. Possible but unactual objects : on what there isn't -- 1. Predicative and impredicative singular propositions -- 2. The classical argument fails -- 3. Creatures of fiction-- 4. Names : their function in fiction -- [pt]. 9. God, evil, and the metaphysics of freedom -- 1. The problem -- 2. The free will defense -- 3. The objection -- 4. Which worlds could God have created? -- 5. Counterfactuals -- 6. Leibniz's lapse -- 7. Transworld depravity -- 8. The free will defense triumphant -- 9. God's existence and natural evil -- 10. God's existence and natural evil -- 11. The probabilistic argument from evil -- [pt]. 10. God and necessity -- 1. The Anselmian statement -- 2. The argument restated -- 3. The argument examined -- 4. A mistaken modal version -- 5. The argument without possible objects -- 6. The Hartshorne-Malcolm version -- 7. A victorious modal version -- 8. Final objections and reflections -- Appendix : Quine's objection to quantified modal logic -- 1. The objection initially stated -- 2. Sizeability is not a property -- 3. The objection restated -- 4. The objection examined -- A. The Hintikka response -- B. The Smullyan reply -- 5. Proper terms and Aristotelian essentialism -- 6. Modal logic and essentialism -- 7. Quine's charge and Professor Marcus -- 8. Quine's charge and Professor Parsons -- 9. Essentialism and applied semantics -- Index.