Includes bibliographical references and index

pt. I. Is there a question? -- 1. Kant -- I. The problem -- II. Kant -- A. Two worlds or one? -- B. Arguments or reasons? -- 2. Kaufman and Hick -- I. Kaufman -- A. The real referent and the available referent -- B. The function of religious language -- II. Hick -- A. The real -- B. Coherent? -- C. Religiously relevant? -- D. Is there such a thing?

pt. II. What is the question? -- 3. Justification and the classical picture -- I. John Locke -- A. Living by reason -- B. Revelation -- II. Classical evidentialism, deontologism, and foundationalism -- A. Classical foundationalism -- B. Classical deontologism -- III. Back to the present -- IV. Problems with the classical picture -- A. Self-referential problems -- B. Most of our beliefs unjustified? -- V. Christian belief justified -- VI. Analogical variations -- A. Variations on classical foundationalism -- B. Variations on the deontology -- C. Is this the de jure question? -- 4. Rationality -- I. Some assorted versions of rationality -- A. Aristotelian rationality -- B. Rationality as proper function -- C. The deliverances of reason -- D. Means-end rationality -- II. Alstonian practical rationality -- A. The initial question -- B. Doxastic practices -- C. Epistemic circularity -- D. The argument for practical rationality -- E. Practical rationality initially characterized -- F. The original position -- G. the wide original position -- H.A narrow original position? -- 5. Warrant and the Freud-and-Marx complaint -- I. The F & M complaint -- A. Freud -- B. Marx -- C. Others -- D. How shall we understand the F & M complaint? -- II. Warrant : the sober truth -- III. The F & M complaint again

pt. III. Warranted Christian belief -- 6. Warranted belief in God -- I. The Aquinas/Calvin model -- A. Models -- B. Presentation of the model -- II. Is belief in God warrant-basic? -- A. If false, probably not -- B. If true, probably so -- III. The de jure question is not independent of the de facto question -- IV. The F & M complaint revisited -- 7. Sin and its cognitive consequences -- I. Preliminaries -- II. Initial statement of the extended model -- III. The nature of sin -- IV. The noetic effects of sin -- A. The basic consequence -- B. Sin and knowledge -- 8. The extended Aquinas/Calvin model : revealed to our minds -- I. Faith -- II. How does faith work? -- III. Faith and positive epistemic status -- IV. Proper basicality and the role of scripture -- V. Comparison with Locke -- VI. Why necessary? -- VII. Cognitive renewal -- 9. The testimonial model : sealed upon our hearts -- I. Belief and affection -- II. Jonathan Edwards -- A. Intellect and will : which is prior? -- B. The affirmations of faith -- III. Analogue of warrant -- IV. Eros -- 10. Objections -- I. Warrant and the argument from religious experience -- II. What can experience show? -- III. A killer argument? -- IV. Son of Great Pumpkin? -- V. Circularity?

pt. IV. Defeaters? -- 11. Defeaters and defeat -- I. Nature of defeaters -- II. Defeaters for Christian or theistic belief -- III. Projective theories a defeater for Christian belief? -- 12. Two (or more) kinds of scripture scholarship -- I. Scripture divinely inspired -- II. Traditional Christian biblical commentary -- III. Historical biblical criticism -- A. Varieties of historical biblical criticism -- B. Tensions with traditional Christianity -- IV. Why aren't most Christians more concerned? -- A. Force majeure -- B.A moral imperative? -- C. Historical biblical criticism more inclusive? -- V. Nothing to be concerned about -- A. Troeltschian historical biblical criticism again -- B. Non-Troeltschian historical biblical criticism -- C. Conditionalization -- VI. Concluding coda -- 13. Postmodernism and pluralism -- I. Postmodernism -- A. Is postmodernism inconsistent with Christian belief? -- B. Do these claims defeat Christian belief? -- C. Postmodernism a failure of nerve -- II. Pluralism -- A.A probabilistic defeater? -- B. The charge of moral arbitrariness -- 14. Suffering and evil -- I. Evidential atheological arguments -- A. Rowe's arguments -- B. Draper's argument -- II. Nonargumentative defeaters?

MyiLibrary allows one user access at a time (21.03.2018)

This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, thus, insofar as they are warranted, Christian beliefs are knowledge if they are true. - Publisher