Includes bibliographical references and index

What can't be eliminated -- The limits of identity -- Why the physical isn't closed -- Free will and agency -- Three arguments for substance dualism -- Problematic dualisms -- Emergent dualism -- Prospects for survival

In The Emergent Self, William Hasker joins a debate in contemporary analytic philosophy, that over the nature of mind. His book challenges physicalist views of human mental functioning and advances the concept of mind as an emergent individual. Hasker begins by mounting a critique of the dominant paradigm in philosophy of mind, showing that contemporary forms of materialism are seriously deficient in confronting crucial aspects of experience. He further holds that popular attempts to explain the workings of mind in terms of mechanistic physics cannot succeed. He then criticizes the two versions of substance dualism most widely accepted today -- Cartesian and Thomistic -- and presents his own theory of emergent dualism. Unlike traditional substance dualisms, Hasker's theory recognizes the critical role of the brain and nervous system for mental processes. It also avoids the mechanistic reductionism characteristic of recent materialism. Hasker concludes by addressing the topic of survival following bodily death. After demonstrating the failure of materialist views to offer a plausible and coherent account of that possibility, he considers the implications of emergentism for notions of resurrection and the afterlife. --From publisher's description