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Persons and causes : the metaphysics of free will / Timothy O'Connor

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: New York : Oxford University Press, 2000Description: xv, 135 pages ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 0195133080
  • 9780195133080
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • ARCH YNDC 123.5 O999P 21
LOC classification:
  • BJ1461 .O27 2000
Contents:
1. Freedom and Determinism. 1.1. An Ancient Argument. 1.2. Some Modal Principles and the Argument for Incompatibilism. 1.3. The Fixity of the Past and of Natural Laws. 1.4. Freedom and Responsibility -- 2. Freedom and Indeterminism: Some Unsatisfactory Proposals. 2.1. The Trouble with Incompatibilism. 2.2. Simple Indeterminism: Carl Ginet on Choice and Control. 2.3. Causal Indeterminism: The General Strategy and a Problem Posed -- 3. The Agent as Cause: Reid Taylor, and Chisholm. 3.1. The Agency Theory. 3.2. Thomas Reid. 3.3. Richard Taylor. 3.4. Roderick Chisholm. Appendix. Chisholm's Later Writings on Agency -- 4. The Metaphysics of Free Will. 4.1. Overview. 4.2. Event Causation. 4.3. Agent Causation
Review: "We suppose that we are morally responsible for what we do, that our creative activities merit credit, and that the unfolding of our relationships with others find their ultimate source in us - in the choices we have freely made. But how is such freedom of choice possible? What are the springs of free will?" "Timothy O'Connor systematically develops an account of human agency intended to shed light on these basic questions. Central to O'Connor's account is the traditional concept of 'agent' or 'personal' causation, a concept that has been largely abandoned in contemporary discussions of free will. After critically assessing previous accounts of this notion by Thomas Reid, Richard Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm, O'Connor reformulates it in relation to contemporary discussions of causation. He then presents an original account of how reasons can explain actions whose causes are their agents, and he concludes by arguing that the freedom of will described by his account is consistent with an understanding of human beings as fully rooted in the natural world." "Persons and Causes makes a significant contribution to the literature on free will and places the issue squarely into the context of contemporary work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, as well as in action theory. It will interest specialists in each of these areas and will serve as an excellent text for advanced courses on free will."--Jacket
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Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode
Archives Archives SAIACS Archives Room Yandell Collection ARCH YNDC 123.5 O999P (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not for loan 064575

Includes bibliographical references (pages 127-132) and index

1. Freedom and Determinism. 1.1. An Ancient Argument. 1.2. Some Modal Principles and the Argument for Incompatibilism. 1.3. The Fixity of the Past and of Natural Laws. 1.4. Freedom and Responsibility -- 2. Freedom and Indeterminism: Some Unsatisfactory Proposals. 2.1. The Trouble with Incompatibilism. 2.2. Simple Indeterminism: Carl Ginet on Choice and Control. 2.3. Causal Indeterminism: The General Strategy and a Problem Posed -- 3. The Agent as Cause: Reid Taylor, and Chisholm. 3.1. The Agency Theory. 3.2. Thomas Reid. 3.3. Richard Taylor. 3.4. Roderick Chisholm. Appendix. Chisholm's Later Writings on Agency -- 4. The Metaphysics of Free Will. 4.1. Overview. 4.2. Event Causation. 4.3. Agent Causation

"We suppose that we are morally responsible for what we do, that our creative activities merit credit, and that the unfolding of our relationships with others find their ultimate source in us - in the choices we have freely made. But how is such freedom of choice possible? What are the springs of free will?" "Timothy O'Connor systematically develops an account of human agency intended to shed light on these basic questions. Central to O'Connor's account is the traditional concept of 'agent' or 'personal' causation, a concept that has been largely abandoned in contemporary discussions of free will. After critically assessing previous accounts of this notion by Thomas Reid, Richard Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm, O'Connor reformulates it in relation to contemporary discussions of causation. He then presents an original account of how reasons can explain actions whose causes are their agents, and he concludes by arguing that the freedom of will described by his account is consistent with an understanding of human beings as fully rooted in the natural world." "Persons and Causes makes a significant contribution to the literature on free will and places the issue squarely into the context of contemporary work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, as well as in action theory. It will interest specialists in each of these areas and will serve as an excellent text for advanced courses on free will."--Jacket

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