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Mental causation / edited by John Heil and Alfred Mele

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1993Description: x, 342 pages : illustrations ; 23 cmISBN:
  • 0198239297
  • 9780198239291
  • 019823564X
  • 9780198235644
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • ARCH YNDC 128.2 H466M 20
LOC classification:
  • BD418.3 .M45 1993
Contents:
Thinking causes / Donald Davidson -- Can supervenience and "non-strict laws' save anomalous monism? / Jaegwon Kim -- On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism / Brian P. McLaughlin -- Davidson's thinking causes / Ernest Sola -- Mental causation : sustaining and dynamic / Robert Audi -- Metaphysics and mental causation / Lynne Rudder Baker -- Mind-body causation and explanatory practice / Tyler Burge -- Mental events as structuring causes of behaviour / Fred Dretske -- The union theory and anti-individualism / Ted Honderich -- Agency and causal explanation / Jennifer Hornsby -- The non-reductivist's troubles with mental causation / Jaegwon Kim -- Explanation in Biopsychology / Ruth Garrett Millikan -- Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? / Robert Van Gulick -- Some content is narrow / Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit -- Object-dependent thoughts : a case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? / H.W. Noonan -- Abilities, concepts, and externalism / Ernest Sosa
Review: "Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing, or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world." "This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature."--Jacket
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Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode
Archives Archives SAIACS Archives Room Yandell Collection ARCH YNDC 128.2 H466M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not for loan 062243

Includes bibliographical references (pages 329-338) and index

Thinking causes / Donald Davidson -- Can supervenience and "non-strict laws' save anomalous monism? / Jaegwon Kim -- On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism / Brian P. McLaughlin -- Davidson's thinking causes / Ernest Sola -- Mental causation : sustaining and dynamic / Robert Audi -- Metaphysics and mental causation / Lynne Rudder Baker -- Mind-body causation and explanatory practice / Tyler Burge -- Mental events as structuring causes of behaviour / Fred Dretske -- The union theory and anti-individualism / Ted Honderich -- Agency and causal explanation / Jennifer Hornsby -- The non-reductivist's troubles with mental causation / Jaegwon Kim -- Explanation in Biopsychology / Ruth Garrett Millikan -- Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? / Robert Van Gulick -- Some content is narrow / Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit -- Object-dependent thoughts : a case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? / H.W. Noonan -- Abilities, concepts, and externalism / Ernest Sosa

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"Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing, or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world." "This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature."--Jacket

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